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An inherent conflict arises when an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) sits in judgment of the actions of the very agency she relies upon
for salary, administrative support and professional advancement. This
conflict, by definition, threatens the impartiality of the decision-maker
and impugns the credibility of the administrative adjudication process.
Various administrative agencies deal with these pitfalls in a
variety of ways, but perhaps, no executive branch agency is as attentive
to these threats as the United States military branches. As will be
described herein, statutory and case law protects military judges from
the evils of "command influence" - that tendency on the part of the
agency to exert result-oriented pressure over a judge. Although military
courts are unique in that they hear and decide criminal cases, the
potential pressures on Executive Branch military judges are identical to
those experienced by civilians who also sit upon Executive Branch
administrative benches.
In Sprague v. King, 825 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. Ill. 1993),
affirmed, 23 F.3d 185 (7th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 513 U.S. 946 (1994),
the court reflected that the position of ALJ was created by the
Administrative Procedure Act (the "APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. The
APA provides an opportunity for a formal hearing on the record before
an impartial hearing examiner, thereby ensuring fairness and due
process in federal rule-making and enforcement proceedings.
Although federal civilian ALJs are exempt by statute and by
regulation from a first-year probationary period and performance
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ratings that are applied to most other federal employees, historically,
agencies have devised schemes whereby control over the decision-
maker was sought,' utilizing the APA to provide a process for
disciplining or removing ALJs "for cause." Luckily, however, a series
of decisions by the Merit Systems Protection Board2 makes it difficult -
but not impossible - for agencies to successfully bring complaints
against ALJs for lack of productivity.3
An issue presently involving ALJs assigned to the Social
Security Administration (SSA) illustrates the problem.
THE BELLMON EXPERIENCE
Perceptions of threats to fairness and due process form the basis
of a series of concerns historically expressed by the Association of
Administrative Law Judges, Inc. (Association) to their sponsoring
agency, the Social Security Administration (SSA).4
In a 1997 open letter to the Commissioner of Social Security,5
the Association offered criticism of certain proposed rules regarding the
"Administrative Review Process under the SSA's Appeals Council's
Authority to Review Cases on its Own Motion."6 These proposed rule
changes were made pursuant to Section 304(g) of P.L. 96-265 (1980),
commonly known as the Bellmon Amendment.7
' Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Federal Administrative Judiciary: Establishing an
Appropriate System of Performance Evaluation for ALJs, 7 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 589, 590, 592
(1993/1994). (See also, Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Symposium on the 50th Anniversary of the APA:
APA-adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity Faltering? 10 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 65, Spring,
1996.)
2See Social Security Administration v. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. 321, 328-332 (1984);
Social Security Administration v. Brennan 19 M.S.P.R. 335, 337 & n. 3, opinion clarified, 20
M.S.P.R. 35 (1984); Social Security Administration v. Balaban, 20 M.S.P.R. 675 (1984).3Lubbers, id. at 595-600.
4See, generally Cofer, "Judges, Bureaucrats and the Question of Independence: A
Study of the Social Security Administration Hearing Process," Greenwood Press, (1985).
5http://www.aalj.org/pres-2.html6Comments Concerning Proposed Rules in Connection with the Administrative
Review Process; Identification and Referral of Cases for Quality Review Under the Appeals
Council's Authority to Review Cases on its Own Motion. Federal Register: September 25, 1997
(Volume 62, Number 186, 50266-50270).
7Section 304(g) of the Social Security Amendments of 1980 stated: "The Secretary
of Health and Human Services shall implement a program of reviewing on his own motion,
decisions rendered by administrative law judges as a result of hearings under Section 221(d)
The Association took exception when the group perceived that
coercive action would be taken against ALJs based upon the results of
random sampling of judge's decisions. Those concerns grew into
litigation against the SSA, resolved in favor of the Association.8
Today, however, under proposals similar to the ones challenged
by the judges in 1984, the SSA again seeks to provide "a national
random sample of favorable ALJ decisions." Likewise, the Association
again contends that SSA will interpret the Bellmon Amendment in a
manner inconsistent with Congressional intent.9
During the 1980's, a number of ALJs were subject to a 100%
review of their cases, and in one office, all ALJs were subject to a
100% review. Claimants who appeared before the ALJs under total
review were subject to more scrutiny than claimants who appeared
before those ALJs not targeted for review. During this time, an ALJ
under Bellmon was forced to reach a higher standard of decision
making, which meant that the record had to contain more medical
evidence than had been previously required. As a result, cases were
delayed for longer periods of time than were cases pending before ALJs
who were not under Bellmon Review scrutiny.
In Phase 1 of the Bellmon Review process, a headquarters
memorandum was prepared pertaining to individual ALJ Bellmon
Review results. The results were developed by a statistical analysis of
the individual ALJ profile (remand orders and decisions as well as
defects discussed in QR (Quality Review) forms contained in an
individual AL's file). The memorandum would request a ranking
regional chiefjudge to "counsel" the individual ALJ in accordance with
SSA policies. Records were maintained of all counselings administered
to the various judges.
Three months after the initial memorandum requesting
"counseling," Phase 2 dictated that individual AL's Bellmon Review
results would be reviewed again to determine any "changed behavior."
of the Social Security Act, and shall report to the Congress by January 1, 1982, on his progress.
' See, Association of Administrative Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F.Supp. 1132
(U.S.D.C., District of Columbia, 1984), plaintiffs successfully challenged the Bellmon Review
Program as established by SSA during 1980-1982.
9See, The Role of the Administrative Law Judge in the Title II Social Security
Disability Insurance Program, Subcommittee on Oversight of Governmental Management of
the Committee of Governmental Affairs, United States Senate (October, 1983).
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If there was no "changed behavior," the SSA would prepare a
memorandum to the Chief ALJ describing the previous actions
concerning the particular ALJ and the results of that counseling.
Headquarters SSA would recommend that the Chief ALJ undertake
corrective action by either repeated counseling or individual training.
Three months after the Phase 2 corrective actions were
implemented, Phase 3 would begin by yet another analysis of the
judge's "behavior." If that judge under scrutiny failed to change his/her
behavior, SSA would initiate action recommending that the ALJ file be
turned over to the Office of Special Counsel for administrative
processing through OPM for appropriate disciplinary action; which act
would include either a suspension or termination action against the ALJ
before the Merit Systems Protection Board.
Eventually, the United States District Court ordered the SSA to
cease its Bellmon Review program, ruling that:
"The defendants' unremitting focus on allowance rates in the
individual ALJ portion of the Bellmon Review Program created an
untenable atmosphere of tensions and unfairness which violated the
spirit of the APA, if no specific provision thereof. Defendants'
insensitivity to that degree of decisional independence the APA affords
to administrative law judges and the injudicious use of phrases such as
'targeting', 'goals' and 'behavior modification' could have tended to
corrupt the ability of administrative law judges to exercise that
independence in the vital cases that they decide .... In close cases, and,
in particular, where the determination of disability may have been based
largely on subjective factors, as a matter of common sense, that
pressure may have intruded upon the fact finding process and may have
influenced some outcomes." 0
The Association contended that had the Bellmon Review
program been effectuated, countless judges would have been brought
before the Merit Systems Protective Board, defending themselves
against suspension or termination actions.
One reason for the ALJ or trial judge's feelings of uncertainty
lay in the interpretation of Section 7521 of the APA, which allows
"°Association of Administrative Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F.Supp. 1132 (D.D.C.
1984).
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adverse actions against an ALJ for "good cause."" It is this nebulous
term -- "good cause" -- that allows an agency the latitude to take action
against a judge for failing to meet production goals or ruling adversely
to administration initiatives.
The ALJ Association now contends that the revitalization of the
Bellmon Review process will resurrect the evils found objectionable by
the District Court, including renewed pressure on ALJs to reduce
allowance rates.' 2
Thus, the battle lines are drawn anew.
The Association contends that the Bellmon II Review
challenges the fundamental fairness of the hearing process. The judges
further claim that if ALJs begin to receive remands of allowance
decisions or receive personalized feedback from the Appeals Council,
the fundamental fairness of the hearing process will be questioned.
Clearly, what is needed to allay the uncertainty of "perceptions,"
is specific statutory protection for judges from the alleged effects of
agency programs like the Bellmon Reviews.
THE MILITARY EXPERIENCE
Like her civilian counterpart, the Military Judge owes her
Executive Branch judicial existence to the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) and executive order. And, like her civilian counterpart,
the Military Judge risks incurring the wrath of her military superiors in
the event she issues an unpopular decision. But, unlike her civilian
counterparts, the Military Judge has enjoyed support in the military and
civilian appellate courts and in Congress to protect her from the evils
of what is termed "unlawful command influence."
Article 1, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 801, defines a military judge as "an
official of a general or special court-martial detailed in accordance
with" Article 26, which reads in pertinent part:
"(b) A military judge shall be a commissioned officer of
" 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.
"Although Bellmon Review Program II does not target specific ALJs, it nevertheless
targets specific types of cases which "[E]xhibit problematic issues or fact patterns that increase
the likelihood of error." See Proposed Section 20 CFR 404.969(b)(1).
Spring 1999
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the armed forces who is a member of the bar of a
Federal court or a member of the bar of the highest
court of a State and who is certified to be qualified for
duty as a military judge by the Judge Advocate General
of the armed force of which such military judge is a
member."
Basically, a military judge is a commissioned officer who also
is a lawyer and certified or assigned as a military judge by the Judge
Advocate General of his service.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice also describes the
functions military judges perform. Article 26(a) generally says that
"(t)he military judge shall preside over each open session of the court-
martial to which he has been detailed." More particularly, the Code
authorizes military judges to hear and determine motions on various
matters. In short, a military judge does the type of things that civilian
judges do.
Of great import to this discussion is the fact that neither the
convening authority (military commander) nor any member of his staff
is able to prepare or review any report concerning the effectiveness,
fitness, or efficiency of the military judge so detailed, which relates to
his or her performance of duty as a military judge.
Congress' intent in this regard was to provide for establishment
of rules on the fitness of military judges, which "to the extent consistent
with the Uniform Code of Military Justice ... should emulate the
standards and procedures that govern investigation and disposition of
allegations concerning judges in the civilian sector."
These protections were put in place to protect against "unlawful
command influence" which has been judicially described as "the mortal
enemy of military justice." United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 393
(CMA 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987). Indeed, even "the
appearance of unlawful command influence is as devastating to the
military justice system as the actual manipulation of any given trial. Cf.
United States v. Cruz, 25 M.J. 326 (CMA 1987)." United States v.
Allen, 33 MJ at 212. Accordingly, appellate case law does not
countenance -- indeed, it condemns -- the calculated carping to the
judge's judicial superiors about his sentencing philosophy. Thus, the
trade-off in a system in which judges lack tenure and professionally
survive only by grace, see United States v. Graf 35 M.J. 450 (CMA
1992), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 917 (1994), is special vigilance to assure
judicial independence. See United States v. Allen, supra; United States
v. Mabe, 33 M.J. 200 (CMA 1991).
Because command influence is the mortal enemy of military
justice, (and equally the mortal enemy of a fair administrative hearing)
Congress specifically prohibited such activity in Art. 37 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 837; see also Art. 98, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. 898.
Cases have held that the exercise of command influence tends
to deprive service members of their constitutional rights. If the target
is the military judge, then the tendency is to deprive the accused of his
right to a forum where impartiality is not impaired because the court
personnel have a personal interest in not incurring reprisals by the
convening authority due to a failure to reach his intended result. Cf.
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927);
United States v. Accordino, 20 M.J. 102 (C.M.A. 1985).
Cannot the same be said in regard to the world of civilian
administrative hearings?
Indeed, the sanctity of the military legal system demands that
judges be held accountable for their actions. However, in the Manual
for Courts-Martial, 1995, Part II, Rules For Courts-Martial, Chapter I.,
General Provisions Rule 109, professional supervision of military
judges and counsel, the President provided, inter alia, that judges could
be disciplined or removed for "unfitness" - but that "unfitness" should
be construed broadly, including, for example, matters relating to the
incompetence, impartiality, and misconduct of the judge. The military
is adroit, however, to ensure that "Erroneous decisions of a judge are
not subject to investigation under this rule. Challenges to these
decisions are more appropriately left to the appellate process."
A full reading of the Rule provides insight which would be of
aid to civilian ALJs:
Rule 109 provides in part:
"(a) In general. Each Judge Advocate General is
responsible for the professional supervision and
discipline of military trial and appellate military judges,
A Uniform Code of Military JusticeSpring 1999
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judge advocates, and other lawyers who practice in
proceedings governed by the code and this Manual. To
discharge this responsibility each Judge Advocate
General may prescribe rules of professional conduct not
inconsistent with this rule or this Manual. Rules of
professional conduct promulgated pursuant to this rule
may include sanctions for violations of such rules.
Sanctions may include but are not limited to indefinite
suspension from practice in courts-martial and in the
Courts of Criminal Appeals. Such suspensions may only
be imposed by the Judge Advocate General of the
armed service of such courts. Prior to imposing any
discipline under this rule, the subject of the proposed
action must be provided notice and an opportunity to be
heard. The Judge Advocate General concerned may
upon good cause shown modify or revoke suspension.
Procedures to investigate complaints against military
trial judges and appellate military judges are contained
in subsection (c) of this rule.
(b) Action after suspension or disbarment. When a
Judge Advocate General suspends a person from
practice or the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
disbars a person, any Judge Advocate General may
suspend that person from practice upon written notice
and opportunity to be heard in writing.
(c) Investigation of judges.
(1) "In general. These rules and procedures promulgated
pursuant to Article 6a are established to investigate and
dispose of charges, allegations, or information
pertaining to the fitness of a military trial judge or
appellate military judge to perform the duties of the
judge's office."
(2) "Policy. Allegations of judicial misconduct or
unfitness shall be investigated pursuant to the
procedures of this rule and appropriate action shall be
taken. Judicial misconduct includes any act or omission
that may serve to demonstrate unfitness for further duty
as a judge, including, but not limited to violations of
applicable ethical standards. The term "unfitness"
should be construed broadly, including, for example,
matters relating to the incompetence, impartiality, and
misconduct of the judge. Erroneous decisions of a judge
are not subject to investigation under this rule.
Challenges to these decisions are more appropriately
left to the appellate process."
(3) "Complaints. Complaints concerning a military trial
judge or appellate military judge will be forwarded to
the Judge Advocate General of the service concerned or
to a person designated by the Judge Advocate General
concerned to receive such complaints. Discussion."
Complaints need not be made in any specific form, but if
possible complaints should be made under oath. Complaints may be
made by judges, lawyers, a party, court personnel, members of the
general public or members of the military community. Reports in the
news media relating to the conduct of a judge may also form the basis
of a complaint. An individual designated to receive complaints under
this subsection should have judicial experience. The chief trial judge of
a service may be designated to receive complaints against military trial
judges.
The analysis to the rule, indicates that the rule is largely
patterned after the pertinent sections of the American Bar Association's
Model Standards Relating to Judicial Discipline and Disability
Retirement (1978), and the procedures dealing with the investigation of
complaints against federal judges contained in 28 U.S.C. 372 (1988)2 3
3See American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice, Chapters 6 (Special
Functions of the Trial Judge); 20 (Appellate Review of Sentences); 21 (Criminal Appeals) (2d
ed.1982). See generally, United States v. Ware, 1 M.J. 282 (CMA 1976). H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
331, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 659 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News
838, 977, 1116. See United States Navy Marine Corps Court of Military Review (hereafter
NMCMR) v. Carlucci, 26 M.J. 328(CMA 1988). See also, United States v. Mabe, 33 M.J. 200
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Clearly, civilian ALJs would benefit from statutory protection
that they be held accountable only for matters relating to the
incompetence, impartiality, and misconduct of the judge. Under the
current APA standard, ALJs can be sanctioned for any one of an
uncountable, ambiguous "good causes."
It is this ambiguity which must be specifically addressed by
Congress to ensure public and professional perceptions of a fair
administrative adjudication process. 4 Therefore, it is incumbent upon
(CMA 1991).
14The remainder of the Rule 109 procedure includes:
(4) Initial action upon receipt of a complaint. Upon receipt, a complaint will be screened by
the Judge Advocate General concerned or by the individual designated in subsection (c)(3) of
this rule to receive complaints. An initial inquiry is necessary if the complaint, taken as
true, would constitute judicial misconduct or unfitness for further service as ajudge. Prior to
the commencement of an initial inquiry, the Judge Advocate General concerned shall be
notified that a complaint has been filed and that an initial inquiry will be conducted. The Judge
Advocate General concerned may temporarily suspend the subject of a complaint from
performing judicial duties pending the outcome of any inquiry or investigation conducted
pursuant to this rule. Such inquiries or investigations shall be conducted with reasonable
promptness. Discussion Complaints under this subsection will be treated with confidentiality.
Confidentiality protects the subject judge and the judiciary when a complaint is not
substantiated. Confidentiality also encourages the reporting of allegations of judicial
misconduct or unfitness and permits complaints to be screened with the full cooperation of
others. Complaints containing allegations of criminality should be referred to the appropriate
criminal investigative agency in accordance with Appendix 3 of this Manual.
(5) Initial inquiry.
(A) In general. An initial inquiry is necessary to determine if the complaint is substantiated.
A complaint is substantiated upon finding that it is more likely than not that the subject judge
has engaged in judicial misconduct or is otherwise unfit for further service as a judge.
(B) Responsibility to conduct initial inquiry. The Judge Advocate General concerned, or the
person designated to receive complaints under subsection (c)(3) of this rule will conduct or
order an initial inquiry. The individual designated to conduct the inquiry should, if practicable,
be senior to the subject of the complaint. If the subject of the complaint is a military trial judge,
the individual designated to conduct the initial inquiry should, if practicable, be a military trial
judge or an individual with experience as a military trial judge. If the subject of the complaint
is an appellate military judge, the individual designated to conduct the inquiry should, if
practicable, have experience as an appellate military judge. Discussion To avoid the type of
conflict prohibited in Article 66(g), the Judge Advocate General's designee should not
ordinarily be a member of the same Court of Criminal Appeals as the subject of the complaint.
If practicable, a former appellate military judge should be designated.
(C) Due process. During the initial inquiry, the subject of the complaint will, at a minimum,
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be given notice and an opportunity to be heard.
(D) Action following the initial inquiry. If the complaint is not substantiated pursuant to
subsection (c)(5)(A) of this rule, the complaint shall be dismissed as unfounded. If the
complaint is substantiated, minor professional disciplinary action may be taken or the
complaint may be forwarded, with findings and recommendations, to the Judge Advocate
General concerned. Minor professional disciplinary action is defined as counseling or the
issuance of an oral or written admonition or reprimand. The Judge Advocate General
concerned will be notified prior to taking minor professional disciplinary action or dismissing
a complaint as unfounded.
(6) Action by the Judge Advocate General.
(A) In general. The Judge Advocates General are responsible for the professional supervision
and discipline of military trial and appellate military judges under their jurisdiction. Upon
receipt of findings and recommendations required by subsection (c)(5) of this rule the Judge
Advocate General concerned will take appropriate action.
(B) Appropriate actions. The Judge Advocate General concerned may dismiss the complaint,
order an additional inquiry, appoint an ethics commission to consider the complaint, refer the
matter to another appropriate investigative agency or take appropriate professional disciplinary
action pursuant to the rules of professional conduct prescribed by the Judge Advocate General
under subsection (a) of this rule. Any decision of the Judge Advocate General, under this rule,
is final and is not subject to appeal. Discussion The discretionary reassignment of military trial
judges or appellate military judges to meet the needs of the service is not professional
disciplinary action.
(C) Standard of proof. Prior to taking professional disciplinary action, other than minor
disciplinary action as defined in subsection (c)(5) of this rule, the Judge Advocate General
concerned shall find, in writing, that the subject of the complaint engaged in judicial
misconduct or is otherwise unfit for continued service as a military judge, and that such
misconduct or unfitness is established by clear and convincing evidence.
(D) Due process. Prior to taking final action on the complaint, the Judge Advocate General
concerned will ensure that the subject of the complaint is, at a minimum, given notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
(7) The Ethics Commission.
(A) Membership. If appointed pursuant to subsection (c)(6)(B) of this rule, an ethics
commission shall consist of at least three members. If the subject of the complaint is a military
trial judge, the commission should include one or more military trial judges or individuals with
experience as a military trial judge. If the subject of the complaint is an appellate military
judge, the commission should include one or more individuals with experience as an appellate
military judge. Members of the commission should, if practicable, be senior to the subject of
the complaint.
(B) Duties. The commission will perform those duties assigned by the Judge Advocate General
Uniform Code of Military JusticeSpring 1999
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administrative law judges to seek legislative redress to ensure they be
held accountable only for matters relating to profession incompetence,
impartiality or misconduct.
concerned. Normally, the commission will provide an opinion as to whether the subject's acts
or omissions constitute judicial misconduct or unfitness. If the commission determines that the
affected judge engaged in judicial misconduct or is unfit for continued judicial service, the
commission may be required to recommend an appropriate disposition to The Judge Advocate
General concerned. Discussion The Judge Advocate General concerned may appoint an ad hoc
or a standing commission.
(8) Rules of procedure. The Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the service concerned may
establish additional procedures consistent with this rule and Article 6a.
Manual for Courts-Martial, 1995, APPENDIX 21, ANALYSIS OF RULES FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL, PART II, RULES FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, CHAPTER 1, GENERAL
PROVISIONS Rule 109, Professional supervision of military judges and counsel.
